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Governance Perspectives of Human Security 
in Africa
Kwesi Aning and Ernest Ansah Lartey
Human security should not be considered as a mere academic rhetoric—it is, in fact, 
a political tool aimed at transforming individuals from conditions of exploitation and 
domination to that of political participation and accountability. This paper adopts 
political governance perspectives to analyze human security in Africa. It argues that 
without accountable democratic governance, the expressed objectives of human 
security would be difficult to achieve in Africa. By this focus, the paper adopts a 
broader view of human security, satisfying both the governance and development 
prerequisites of the concept, which has underpinned [in] security in Africa. The 
overall estimation of human security in Africa is that only a marginal improvement 
has been made in the region, especially over the last decade.
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Introduction
Since the early 1990s, the term ‘human security’ has been used to signal a shift 
in the ways security is viewed across the world. The concept was meant to 
demonstrate a “paradigm” shift from the traditional concept of security, which 
predominantly emphasized military defense of state interests and territorial 
boundaries (Paris 2001). This traditional notion of security was the type which 
shaped many national security policies and architectures, especially during the 
cold war period. However, while the traditional security or state-centric security 
was meant to strengthen and to stabilize state governance institutions and to 
ensure state monopoly over the means of force and violence (Civic and Miklaucic 
2011), it nonetheless led to the creation of ‘regime security,’ which—at the very 
best—created and spread authoritarian rule across many parts of Africa. 
As argued by Luckham (2003), part of the reason is that the security 
structures, which emerged following statebuilding at independence, still reflected 
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the repressive tendencies characterized by colonial rule. In many instances across 
Africa, these colonial legacies have persisted and the search for ways to reduce 
and replace those tendencies still remains a challenge. Especially within the Cold-
war period, it was thought to be necessary that the post-independence governance 
process required a certain political posture which had to be extensively sensitive 
to the external ideological influences. This undermined political accountability at 
home, especially in the ways state institutions were built to protect ruling regimes 
as opposed to the state (Bryden and Fairlie 2015). Without proper political 
accountability and limited participation in governance and security, control 
and access to the political center has become a violent struggle, thus exposing 
the insecurity dilemma which most states in Africa exhibit today. Weak state 
institutions—as a result of their less accountability reforms—cannot be addressed 
without a shift of the security discourse from regime-based to people-centered. 
Majority of African population are still at risk as global health threats, 
frequent and intense natural disasters, spiraling conflict, violent extremism, 
terrorism and related humanitarian crises such as forced displacement of 
people threaten to negate the large measure of development progress made in 
recent decades. In spite of the fact that a good spectrum of these humanitarian 
crises is naturally-based, unsustainable man-made exploitation of the natural 
environment has also led to this current level of global risks and vulnerabilities 
(see UN 2015, para. 14). Also, and more importantly, it has to be argued that a 
combination of state and non-state actors’ proliferation of armed groups and 
violence has underpinned this risk; often caused by violations of human rights 
and rule of law, as well as the inability to hold perpetrators to account (Ndiaye 
2010).
The customary security and justice systems, which in several cases predate 
the modern state institutions, increasingly serve as alternative avenues for the vast 
majority of African population (see Aning and Aubyn 2018; Jaye 2018). However, 
inherent in these alternative security systems, are as argued by M’Cormack-
Hale (2018) certain beliefs and practices which are thought to be inimical to the 
survival, safety and wellbeing of the population, especially the vulnerable group 
such as women and children.
Similarly, in spite of all the plaudits about increasing economic growth in 
the region, poverty, hunger, and diseases continue to expose weaknesses in the 
development paradigms and policies of most African countries (Cheru 2007). 
Majority of the population still live on less than a dollar a day, and are unable to 
enjoy basic necessities such as food, literacy, health, shelter, sanitation and quality 
climate (UN 2015). By way of seeking to bridge the security-development gap, the 
United Nations (UN 2015) implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development, which spelt out broad targets to among others lift populations 
out of poverty, protect the planet and ensure that all people enjoy peace and 
prosperity, remains a crucial emphasis for deepening and expanding the security 
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concept.
This paper looks at human security from the perspective of political 
governance in Africa. It essentially argues that without accountable democratic 
governance, the expressed objectives of human security (namely, freedom from 
fear and freedom from want) would be difficult to achieve in Africa. In this 
context, democratic governance, which connotes participation and ownership of 
political decisions and outcomes (see Haynes 2006), is seen as a tool to transform 
both the root causes of insecurity (include structural issues such as poverty, 
inequality, health pandemics and environmental hazards), as well as the effects of 
insecurity (namely conflicts, violent extremism, and inadequate respect for the 
rule of law and human rights).  
The paper extensively draws on two sets of research reports, namely Freedom 
House Report (Freedom House 2019) and Ibrahim Index of African Governance 
(IIAG 2018) to discuss the topic of human security in Africa. While the Freedom 
House Report disaggregated its analysis, covering sub-Saharan Africa vis-à-vis the 
rest of the regions in the world, the Ibrahim Index of African Governance report 
focuses entirely on Africa. Such comparison allows for deeper reflections, and 
contextual operationalization of human security in this paper. This means that 
even though reference is made to the term sub-Saharan Africa in the text a few 
times, it does not limit the scope of the discussion on human security in Africa. 
The indicators used in measuring human security in this paper include: (1) safety 
and rule of law; (2) participation and human rights; (3) sustainable economic 
opportunity; and, (4) human development as adopted from the IIAG 2018. The 
overall estimation of human security in Africa, as argued by the paper, is that 
only a marginal improvement has been made in the region, especially over the 
last decade. This is because despite the fact that there are now more countries 
claiming to be democratic than was seen in the early 1990s, there are still 
governance deficits in the form of violent political contestations and the abuse of 
the rule of law in some countries which continue to undermine the continent’s 
human security.
Explaining Human Security
In contrast to human security (which will be explained in detail in a little while), 
state security on the one hand, depicts the condition in which institutions, 
processes and structures of the state (especially that of the state security 
institutions) continue to be governed and shaped by the rule of law irrespective 
of the composition of the ruling elites. Regime security on the other hand is often 
concerned with the condition in which the governing elites are protected despite 
violent challenges to their rule (see Jackson 2007). This becomes possible when 
the entire national security policy architecture is shaped purposely to safeguard 
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the regime from internal opposition (Bryden, N’Diaye, and Oloniskin 2008). In 
Africa, the focus on and dominance of regime protection in the past has made the 
two concepts somewhat indistinguishable. As a result, African countries rather 
tend to exhibit more internal state weakness and fragility than from the external 
sphere (ibid.). Thus, these conditions provide the ideal impetus for democratic 
processes to be coupled with security and defense sector reforms, which will 
incorporate the respect for human rights and the rule of law.
From the perspective of the United Nations, the concept of human security 
has become even more pertinent today as living conditions of the vast majority 
of the world’s population continue to worsen. By 2015, in spite of the tremendous 
human development progress, the UN was still concerned about the deteriorating 
humanitarian trend and articulated that:
Billions of our citizens continue to live in poverty and are denied a life of dignity. 
There are rising inequalities within and among countries. There are enormous 
disparities of opportunity, wealth and power. Gender inequality remains a key 
challenge. Unemployment, particularly youth unemployment, is a major concern. 
Global health threats, more frequent and intense natural disasters, spiraling conflict, 
violent extremism, terrorism and related humanitarian crises and forced displacement 
of people threaten to reverse much of the development progress made in recent 
decades (UN 2015, para. 14). 
The United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) report further states 
that: 
Natural resource depletion and adverse impacts of environmental degradation, 
including desertification, drought, land degradation, freshwater scarcity and loss 
of biodiversity, add to and exacerbate the list of challenges which humanity faces. 
Climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our time and its adverse impacts 
undermine the ability of all countries to achieve sustainable development. Increases 
in global temperature, sea level rise, ocean acidification and other climate change 
impacts are seriously affecting coastal areas and low-lying coastal countries, including 
many least developed countries and Small Island developing States. The survival of 
many societies, and of the biological support systems of the planet, is at risk (UN 
2015, para. 14).
Indeed, these risks reflect the strands of human security to be discussed later in 
this section. However, by way of background, it has to be stressed that prior to 
the publication of the human development report in 1990, the discourse around 
development, especially within the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) had assumed a different focus. The focus prioritized a shift away from 
the dominant economic model, which emphasized income/expenditure as a 
measure of poverty, to incorporating qualitative attributes such as literacy and life 
expectancy, which placed the human being at the center of development (UNDP 
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1994). Consequently, an important outcome of this human development concept 
was the shift in emphasis to human security from the traditional state-centric 
approach to security. Even though, leading scholars (Buzan et al. 1998; Axworthy 
2001) have given an analytical framework for explaining and assessing human 
security, the determination by the UNDP to dedicate its 1994 annual flagship 
report to human security certainly increased the currency of the concept beyond 
a mere academic rhetoric to an approach deserving of global and national policy 
attention (see UNDP 1994).  
However, in spite of its primary concern for the individual as opposed to the 
state, the concept of human security has been defined in a variety of ways. It often 
connotes something that is basic to the human being and must be guaranteed to 
ensure human survival. In other words, human security is concerned with the 
enjoyment of certain basic standards (minimum normative threshold) for the 
individual but below which the person’s survival and wellbeing may be threatened 
(Gasper 2010). Such minimum normative thresholds may include the ability to 
afford basic necessities of life such as food, health, shelter, clothing, education, 
sanitation, and quality environment (ibid.; Alkire 2003). 
In this same regard, one can also think of a maximum (optimum) normative 
threshold beyond which survival and wellbeing can also be threatened. For 
example, whereas both contentment, including the ability to be prosperous in 
life, and command self-actualization are thought to be desirable ends in the 
hierarchy of human development needs (Maslow 1954), the aspects of greed can 
constitute a threat to survival and wellbeing. In Africa, leading scholars contend 
that most armed conflicts which have spread across the continent have their roots 
in greed (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Quantson’s (2010, 2) definition of what 
security is makes a modest attempt to bring these different thresholds together 
in a conceptual framework that he describes as: survival, safety, wellbeing 
and contentment. Contentment, in this instance, seeks to set the ‘maximum 
normative threshold’ beyond which the exercise of one’s desire could be viewed as 
greed—the consequences of which can be instability and insecurity as witnessed 
in many parts of Africa.
In similar respects, it has become common place to find the core attributes 
of human security described broadly as both “freedom from want” and “freedom 
from fear.” When seen as freedom from want, human security describes a state 
of being in which basic material needs are met. This also translates into having 
a reasonable expectation for protection and affordability during crisis such that 
survival is not threatened. Similarly, when viewed as freedom from fear, human 
security depicts a condition of existence in which human dignity—especially as 
impacted by violent conflicts and mass atrocity crimes such as crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, genocide and ethnic cleansing—is preserved. Thomas, for 
instance, has an extended view of this strand of human security when he argues 
that freedom from fear should equally encompass meaningful participation in 
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development such that there is a substantive account of, for example, politics 
as freedom from domination or exploitation, and not simply as an exercise of 
freedom to choose (Thomas 2007, 108).
The specific attributes of human security when viewed from a normative 
perspective is illustrated in Table 1. It can be found that whereas human security 
envisages a perspective of positive peace because of the emphasis on global 
justice and structural reform, traditional security entrenches negative peace as it 
underscores military power as justification of stability.
Again, rather than seeing human security as a contrast opposition 
to traditional security, the specific attributes of human security suggest a 
future development path in which globalization will become the fulcrum for 
guaranteeing survival and wellbeing.
In spite of its major successes, especially in terms of using human rights, 
rule of law, treaty-based solutions and a humanitarian conception to drive 
humanitarian assistance, international interventions, including peacekeeping and 
post-conflict peacebuilding (ibid., 113), the implementation of human security, 
especially as freedom from fear, has often come into conflict with national 
interests. This is partly because of the fact that there is a certain convolution of 
issues that potentially risk being securitized (i.e. ordinary political issues being 
Table 1. Comparison between Traditional Security and Human Security
Indicator Traditional Security Human security
1 Referent object The state Humanity (individuals)
2 Operating principle The state and national security Global holism and connectivity
3 Agenda Justification and status quo
Military power
National defence
Explanation and transformation 
(economic and Social welfare)
4 Means Self-help by states Collective, integrated, multifaceted 
response at multiple levels
5 Input Military expenditure and arms Redistribution, structural reform
6 Output Secure borders Enjoyment of economic, social, civil 
and political and cultural human 
rights
7 Outcome Interstate stability
Order
Global social justice





10 Attribute of Peace Negative peace Positive peace
Source: Adapted from Thomas (2007, 110).
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brought under traditional security) and elevated as national security concern or 
threat. Nonetheless, it has to be said that the need to shift focus to human security 
has not only helped to bridge the security-development gap, but has particularly 
inspired a series of reforms in political governance and security sector in Africa. 
Notably, it is believed that democracy remains one of the fundamental means 
through which human security can be achieved. 
Democratization, Governance, and Human Security
The idea that democratic governance is an important prerequisite for the 
enjoyment of human security has somewhat been embraced by many African 
countries. This is evident in the so-called “third wave of democratization” which 
virtually swept across most parts of the developing world, including Africa. 
It is observed that between the 1980s and 1990s, many developing countries 
transitioned into democratic rule. This was a sharp contrast from the situation in 
the 1950s and 1960s when many countries rather had non-democratic regimes, 
typified variously as military, one-party, no-party and personalistic dictatorships 
(Haynes 2007). These types of regimes turned security into personalized 
protection and used the security agencies against their own populations. 
In fact, some experts have put it more succinctly:
At the heart of African insecurity story is a breakdown in governance systems 
due in large part to rule by patronage and the associated misuse of governmental 
instruments of coercion to entrench political and social exclusion. At best, while 
maintaining a façade of viability and stability, this situation has created state 
repression of local population under authoritarian regimes concerned, above all, with 
preserving the regime rather than ensuring security of the state and its citizens. At 
worst, it has led to the outbreak of armed conflict and humanitarian tragedy (Bryden, 
N’Diaye, and Oloniskin 2008, 3).
By the year 2000, there were as many as forty-five (45) new democracies across 
the developing world. Of this number, Africa had eighteen (18) new democracies. 
Five (5) of this number were rated as “free” new democracies, and thirteen 
(13) were categorized as “partly free” new democracies. However, in spite of 
the positive democratic trend, there are ample signs that the quality of “free 
democratic countries” is in decline. This trend is obvious in the 2019 Freedom 
House report, which observes that there has been a thirteen (13) consecutive year 
decline in global democratic freedoms. The report suggests that: 
The reversal has spanned a variety of countries in every region, from long-standing 
democracies like the United States to consolidated authoritarian regimes like China 
and Russia. The overall losses are still shallow compared with the gains of the late 20th 
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century, but the pattern is consistent and ominous. Democracy is in retreat (Freedom 
House 2019, 1).
It is further observed that, for instance, between 1988 and 2005 the percentage 
of countries rated “Not Free” in democracy in the world dropped by almost 
14 percent (i.e. from 37 to 23 percent), whereas the share of “Free” democratic 
countries increased (from 36 to 46 percent). Unfortunately, this positive trend 
has slowly reversed to the extent that between 2005 and 2018, the share of “Not 
Free” democratic countries increased to 26 percent, while the share of “Free” 
democratic countries declined to 44 percent. The decline in the number of free 
democratic countries in the world is said to be caused by violent conflicts, violent 
extremism, and more especially electoral violence. This is particularly so because 
authoritarian regimes continue to perpetuate their rule through constitutional 
changes which allow them to remove and extend both term and age limits. The 
countries which exhibited the most significant risks in free democratic processes 
in Africa in 2018 include Burundi, Togo, Benin, Cameroon, and Senegal (ibid.). 
However, in spite of these declines, a few countries in the region were able to 
show considerable improvements in their free democratic credentials, following 
successful elections, and the opening up of their democratic space to entrench the 
rule of law, respect for human rights, and the determination to tackle corruption 
in societies where hitherto were under authoritarian rule. For instance, the 
countries with these significant strides include The Gambia, Angola and Ethiopia. 
Moreover, even in authoritarian regimes such as Cameroon, Sudan and Algeria, 
continuous public pressure is beginning to cause democratic change even amidst 
state sponsored intimidation, security crackdown and repression of citizens. 






Americas Asia Pacific MENA Euroasia Europe
C’try Pop. C’try Pop. C’try Pop. C’try Pop. C’try Pop. C’try Pop. C’try Pop.
Free (%) 18 11 66 69 46 39 11 4 81 83 44 39
Partly Free 
(%)
43 50 26 26 33 21 22 13 42 20 17 4 30 24
Not Free 
(%)















Countries 49 35 39 18 12 42 195
Source: Extracted from Freedom House report (2019).
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However, most certainly, such trends are deemed to inspire citizens desire for 
freedom from political dictatorship (ibid.).
Knowing that Africa (and for that matter, sub-Saharan Africa) is greatly 
influenced by global political events and trends, a discussion of its free democratic 
practice will make greater meaning if other countries and regions are brought in 
view of the discussion. As illustrated in Table 2, of the forty-nine (49) countries 
studied in sub-Saharan Africa, only 18 percent (representing only nine countries) 
were rated as free democratic states. This contrasts somewhat significantly with 
the global average of 44 percent. It also represents a large deficit as compared 
with the Americas and Europe, which were rated 66 percent and 81 percent 
respectively. Sub-Saharan Africa only performed better than Middle East and 
Northern Africa (MENA) and Euroasia where, currently, there are severe political 
crisis (involving activities of violent extremists and fragile political regimes) 
which has engulfed countries like Syria, Yemen, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya. In 
terms of the share of population who enjoys free democratic expressions of the 
rule of law and human rights, sub-Saharan Africa with estimated total population 
figure of 1.1 billion, had only 11 percent of its population being free. This again 
represents a large deficit from the global average of 39 percent, and is also a far 
cry from what obtains in countries in Asia Pacific, Americas and Europe which 
were rated 39 percent, 69 percent and 83 percent respectively; interestingly, the 
contrast between Africa and the rest of the regions would have been sharper had 
North African countries (presently captured in MENA) been included in the 
African statistics.
It is unsurprising that distressed populations—mainly the youth, women 
and children—from the least free democratic countries continue to suffer the 
risk of human trafficking and irregular migration ostensibly to seek haven in 
the so-called free democratic countries. Table 2 also shows that, while twenty-
one (21) African countries (representing 43 percent) are classified as partly free 
democratic states, a significant proportion (50 percent) of its population still 
experience substantial limitations to freely express their democratic and human 
rights. More so, additional 39 percent of its population is said to endure no free 
democratic choices. Thus, it appears that while political regimes may enjoy the 
façade of being “strong” and “stable”, there is a gradual erosion (underneath that 
façade) of human security of the populations in Africa. 
It has to be seen that, in spite of the foregoing observations, it is not 
uncommon to find African governments cast misgivings over analysis on African 
democratic governance based on data sources generated from Western-based 
think tanks, or local civil society organizations that receive funding support 
from Western partners. Such misgivings may be borne out of a genuine need to 
question underlining assumptions, methodology and other political agendas, 
which may be hidden in such Western-driven analysis and reports. Similarly, 
it could also be based on mere refusal to admit weaknesses in adhering to 
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good governance principles as has often been the case in Africa. As a result, 
data sources which may have a Pan-African outlook such as the Ibrahim Index 
of African Governance (IIAG) may have some greater appeal to most African 
governments. The next section discusses African human security issues based on 
the 2018 IIAG. 
Defined based on generic governance criteria, human security is described 
in terms of the quality of being in a variety of core qualitative variables such as 
(1) safety and rule of law; (2) participation and human rights; (3) sustainable 
economic opportunity; and, (4) human development. Since 2007, these core 
human security standards have been evaluated and rated across Africa to 
show how countries compare with their own peers in the region as opposed to 
countries from outside the African region. 
In 2017, Africa had an overall average governance score of just about 50 
percent. This represents a “slowing improvement” because it recorded just a 
marginal cumulative change of (+1) since 2008. This means that Africa has not 
seen any significant change in its overall human security situation since 2008. 
However, there were slightly higher scores in the categories of safety and rule 
of law (52.6 percent) and human development (52.8 percent). The remaining 
two categories: participation and human rights (49.2 percent) and sustainable 
economic opportunity (44.8 percent) both scored below the overall average in 
the region. Again, in terms of the cumulative change over the period between 
2008 and 2017, Africans enjoyed slight improvements in the area of participation 
and human rights (+2.9), sustainable economic opportunity (+0.1), and human 
development (+3.5). However, in spite of its 52.6 percent score in 2017, safety and 
rule of law plummeted by -2.5 in the cumulative period between 2008 and 2017. 
This means that while Africans are steadily enjoying improvements in the human 
development indicators, the population has become worse off in terms of safety 
and rule of law within the last decade. 
Further, within the last decade, the 2018 IIAG report observes that whereas 
there were as many as thirty-four (34) African countries with improvements 
in their governance performance, eighteen (18) countries actually experienced 
deteriorated conditions in the quality of their governance (which also, almost 
invariably, translates to a decline in the quality of their human security). One 
country did not experience any change in its governance conditions over the 10-
year period. The report further highlights that of the thirty-four (34) countries 
which experienced improvements in their governance processes, only fifteen (15) 
countries experienced “increasing improvement,” while thirteen (13) countries 
experienced “slowing improvement.” The remaining seven (7) countries are noted 
as showing “slowing decline” in their governance processes. Six (6) countries 
are deemed to be bouncing back to favorable governance conditions from their 
previous deterioration position within the last ten years. As many as twelve (12) 
countries have experienced “increasing deterioration.” More so, whereas Libya 
 Governance Perspectives of Human Security in Africa 229
experienced the greatest deterioration level (-15.6) in its governance architecture 
and processes, Cote d’Ivoire showed the greatest improvement level of (+12.7) in 
Africa. Table 3 shows how the top ten and bottom ten countries have performed 
in their governance processes in 2017.
The top ten statistics in Table 3a shows a great deal of variability in the 
respective governance performances over the last ten years. Only two (2) 
countries (Seychelles and Ghana) experienced ‘increasing improvement” in their 
governance processes. As many as four (4) countries, namely Namibia, Rwanda, 
Tunisia, and Senegal merely showed “slowing improvement.” Moreover, whereas 
one (1) country (South Africa) is “bouncing back” from its previous deteriorating 
trajectory, as many as three (3) countries, namely Mauritius, Cabo Verde and 
Botswana are already showing signs of “increasing deterioration” in their human 
security standards. Thus far, even though a country’s position on the ranking 
may suggest improved political governance at current level, the variability in the 
governance indicators over a period, however, serves as critical pointers as to 
whether a country is backsliding or entrenching political governance.
From Table 3b, the bottom ten countries also show similar variations in 
their governance performance as was amply seen in the top ten (10) analysis in 
Table 3a. Apart from countries such as Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 
Equatorial Guinea, and Libya, which continue to deteriorate at an increasing 
pace in their political governance processes, all the other countries in the 
Table 3a. Top 10 and Bottom 10 Governance Performance in Africa
Top 10 Countries
Rank/54 Country 2017 score/100
Performance over last 10 years
Change (2008-2017) Classification
1st Mauritius 79.5 (-0.7) Increasing deterioration
2nd Seychelles 73.2 (+4.0) Increasing improvement
3rd Cabo Verde 71.1 (-0.8) Increasing deterioration
4th Namibia 68.6 (+3.3) Slowing improvement
5th Botswana 68.5 (-3.7) Increasing deterioration
6th Ghana 68.1 (+0.9) Increasing improvement
7th South Africa 68.0 (-0.6) Bouncing back
8th Rwanda 64.3 (+5.9) Slowing improvement
9th Tunisia 63.5 (+6.9) Slowing improvement
10th Senegal 63.3 (+5.9) Slowing improvement
African Average 49.9 (+1.0) Slowing improvement
Source: Extracted from IIAG report (2018).
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league have shown signs of reversing their deteriorating trend over the last ten 
years. However, in spite of this positive highlight, it can be seen that majority of 
populations in this league enjoy less human security as they constantly experience 
a mixture of conflicts, violence, violent extremism, intimidation, and repressive 
political regimes. Thus, it can be observed that irrespective of a county’s position 
in the governance index, there is still the potential risk of declining if reforms are 
not carried out in the security sector. 
Security Sector Reform and Governance in Africa
It will be an exercise in futility to have democracy in Africa without a correspon- 
ding reform of the security sector. Indeed, if African citizens are to enjoy freedom 
from fear of regime repression, brutality, armed conflicts and violence, then a 
different approach (i.e. a human security approach) to the ways in which security 
sector institutions operate should be of prime interest. This calls for dynamic 
civil-military (security) engagements with human rights and the rule of law 
(rather than brute force) being the driving force behind security architectures and 
policies in Africa. Reversals and/or backsliding in democracy and the rule of law 
in Africa are partly attributed to a lack of security sector reform (Houngnikpo 
2012). The human security approach to security sector operations and delivery 
Table 3b. Top 10 and Bottom 10 Governance Performance in Africa
Bottom 10 Countries
Rank/54 Country 2017 score/100
Performance over last 10 years
Change (2008-2017) Classification
45th Angola 38.3 (+0.7) Warning sign
46th Chad 35.4 (+4.6) Slowing improvement
47th DRC 32.1 (-2.8) Increasing deterioration
48th Equatorial Guinea 30.9 (-0.1) Increasing deterioration
49th Sudan 30.8 (+1.4) Increasing improvement
50th CAR 29.5 (-2.5) Bouncing back
51st Eritrea 29.3 (-2.9) Bouncing back
52nd Libya 28.3 (-15.6) Increasing deterioration
53rd South Sudan 19.3 X X
54th Somalia 13.6 (+6.0) Increasing improvement
African Average 49.9 (+1.0) Slowing improvement
Source: Extracted from IIAG report (2018).
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requires a shift to democratic rule, where security forces are expected to operate 
within a democratic culture (Aning 2008). This is essentially because, as some 
other scholars have argued, a safe and secure environment tends to promote 
economic and political development. As such, countries with weak governance 
systems are seen to risk higher rates of impunity by security forces, making both 
the state and citizens less secured (Ball 2014).
Broadly speaking, security sector reform (SSR) deals with creating a 
nationally owned process to promote the effective and efficient provision of 
security and justice in accordance with citizens’ needs, representing a system 
wherein security and justice providers are accountable to the state and its 
people, and operates within a framework of democratic governance, rule of 
law, and respect for human rights (OEDC DAC 2005; Aning 2008). So far, the 
forgoing discussions have shown how African countries and populations have 
fared under the prevailing attributes of democratic governance, rule of law and 
human rights—all critical components of SSR. Measurements based on these 
attributes have shown variability in performance across time, countries and 
regions. However, in spite of the current favorable ranking by, for example the 
IIAG, even occupants of the top ten category still exhibit signs of deterioration 
in their governance and human security processes over the last ten years. It is 
argued that part of the ways to reverse the deteriorating trend in Africa is to 
reorient the security forces to make them more effective, efficient, accountable 
and transparent (Aning and Lartey 2009; Djindjere 2010).
In the region, even though the SSR effort is still deemed to be an on-
going process, the attempt at introducing the core principles of effectiveness, 
efficiency, accountability and transparency in the security sector has produced 
mixed results so far. This is partly because of one main reason: there has been 
over concentration of effort on training and equipping of security forces without 
incorporating the dimensions of accountability and transparency. This approach 
has led to lopsided results in most SSR programs in Africa. This is especially so 
because of the desperate need to build strong capabilities for the security forces to 
be able to deal with threats of internal insurrection, terrorism, violent extremism, 
and transnational organized crimes such as drug trafficking, arms trafficking and 
piracy. It is thought that these threats require continues training and equipping 
of the state security forces in order to make them effective. Meanwhile, there are 
deficits of human rights and the rule of law which underpin provision of security 
in conflict and violent extremism contexts. Countries such as Somalia, South 
Sudan, Burundi, DRC, Guinea Bissau, Uganda, Rwanda, and Mali have had 
their security sector reforms geared more or less in this direction” of operational 
strengthening” (Bryden and Olonisakin 2010).
The increasing escalation in violent extremism in the Sahel region, has 
brought about initiatives such as the G5 Sahel, comprising Burkina Faso, Chad, 
Niger, Mali and Mauritania. This is largely a military capability—not the least 
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aimed at reforming security institutions—but rather focused more on countering 
the violent extremist elements that are generating insecurity for the population 
in the Sahel region. Similarly, the Multinational Joint Taskforce (MNJTF), 
including the military from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria, designed 
to counter the Boko Haram insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin is also aimed 
at operational strengthening as opposed to governance strengthening of the 
security forces. Beside the human rights abuses and violations reportedly being 
committed against ordinary civilians and prisoners by the security forces involved 
in these operations (see Human Rights Watch 2015), steps should be taken to 
avoid the risks of regimes and personnel visiting or extending such human rights 
violations to their own citizens after exiting these operations. A continuous 
security sector reform process, especially focusing on the accountability and 
transparency aspects will be required to recreate the needed ‘concordance’ (Schiff 
2009) between the civilians and security forces who are entangled in this conflict 
system (Diallo 2009).
Nonetheless, as part of the security sector reform process, the idea of 
‘democratic policing,’ which calls for more accountability and transparency 
in the delivery of security has been given some close attention in Africa. Even 
though, the process is being undermined by the recent escalation of violent 
extremism, there are still areas where some success has been achieved. For 
instance, drawn from the need to incorporate customer service philosophy into 
the work of the security sector, community policing has been introduced as part 
of the SSR process to improve the quality of the police service and customer 
satisfaction. This fundamentally, involves greater working relationship between 
the police and the public (Bannet 1994). The concept has been deployed both as 
a philosophy and organizational strategy in post-conflict countries such as Sierra 
Leone and Liberia. Notably, platforms such as “local police partnership boards” 
in Sierra Leone (Gbla 2018, 10) and the county security committees in Liberia 
(Jaye 2008) have enabled community members and police to team up in new 
ways to address issues of crime, violence, domestic and gender-based violence, 
and land and chieftaincy disputes (Jaye 2018). In some instances, Tilley (2008, 
376) contends that community policing had been integrated in the structure 
of the police organization, employing community policing officers, adopting a 
proactive approach, engaging in problem-solving with community members, 
and other agencies, and adopting decentralized ways of working. For instance, 
in both Liberia and Sierra Leone, it was partly this sort of community-security 
partnership arrangements that enabled the country to overcome the Ebola virus 
crisis in 2014, and particularly much so in Sierra Leone during the mudslide 
disaster in 2017 (Gbla 2018).
Across board, the security policy space in Africa still portrays a regime-
centric posture. While new constitutions have emerged, the frequent violent 
and irregular assaults on these new constitutions (either through military 
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interference or executive manipulations) have led to the weakening of other state 
institutions such as the legislature, judiciary, and even civil society. Most security 
legislations are not aligned with current democratic tenets. They still reflect the 
colonial and autocratic tendencies, which emphasized repression as opposed to 
protection of citizens (Houngnikpo 2012). To fully embrace, human security in 
Africa, countries must begin to develop broad-based national security policy and 
strategy which incorporates the human security needs of the population. Such 
policies will determine which security issues should be prioritized and with what 
resource allocation and accountability. 
Another evidence of regime-centered security in Africa relates to the 
architectures of national security, where almost all the members constituting the 
national security architecture are party appointees, and even when they represent 
their security institutions, professionalism is sacrificed for patronage biases 
(Houngnikpo 2012). By this composition, there is a high risk of the national 
security council members aligning loyalties with the personal interest of the 
appointing authority (which is often the Commander-in-Chief or the president) 
(see Bryden, N’Diaye, and Oloniskin 2008, 3; Houngnikpo 2012). Kondeh (2008) 
explains further that presidents in Africa wield tremendous powers, allowing 
autocratic and despotic leaders to appoint people not on the basis of professional 
competence but on their personal and partisan loyalty. This reinforces regime 
security as opposed to national security. The resultant effect is the perpetuation 
of repressive rule, which ultimately threatens the enjoyment of human security 
in Africa. Even with the limited chance of political turnover experiences in 
countries such as Ghana, Senegal, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Nigeria, it does seem 
that each turnover is viewed by both incumbent and opposition parties as “regime 
overthrow,” which rather impedes smooth transition of political power after 
elections in Africa.
Conclusion
Based on generic governance criteria, human security is described in terms of the 
quality of being in a variety of core qualitative variables such as (1) safety and rule 
of law; (2) participation and human rights; (3) sustainable economic opportunity; 
and, (4) human development. Within the last decade, these core human security 
standards have been evaluated and rated across Africa to show how countries 
compare with their own peers in the region. It was observed that while some 
countries such Seychelles and Ghana have shown increasing improvement only a 
marginal improvement was recorded in the overall position of human security in 
Africa. Indeed, other countries such as Mauritius and Cabo Verde, even though 
enjoy the ranks of the top ten governance category, have started showing signs of 
increasing deterioration over the last decade. 
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Importantly, however, African countries have had an iterative transition 
toward the concept of human security. This is partly because of the “insecurity 
dilemma” (i.e. the fear that regime security will provoke and escalate violent 
contests from internal spheres) which stems from the cycle of political instability 
and autocratic rule in the region. Often, citizen’s needs and interests do not 
find expression in political settings where human rights and the rule of law are 
absent and/or inadequate. In Africa, adherence to the rule of law and respect 
for human rights appear to be a natural struggle for most governments. This 
is because the pursuit of regime security while maintaining respect for human 
rights and the rule of law appears incompatible in their governance perspectives. 
While democracy seeks to overcome this challenge, the continent still finds itself 
embroiled in an era of violent extremism and terrorism, producing a different 
kind of security dynamics that emphasizes operational strengthening of the 
security forces rather than a focus on security sector governance.
Nevertheless, given the tortuous approach to the free democratic process 
and the fragile prosecution of the rule of law in Africa, the achievement of human 
security seems far from reach, not least in the immediate-medium term. Indeed, 
the abovementioned statistics of Africa currently posting only nine (9) countries 
(i.e. 18 percent)—which also translates to only 11 percent of its citizens being 
freely democratic—lends credence to the difficulty in expending and deepening 
the human security concept and practice on the continent. There are still about 
forty (40) countries in Africa whose free democratic conditions remain fragile, 
while over 80 percent of the citizens still live under political regimes, which 
are experiencing conflicts or political crises or violent extremism or repressive 
security forces. This is in spite of the democratic spread, which accompanied the 
so-called “third wave of democratization” in Africa in the early 1990s. Security 
sector reform must be given a new focus away from the traditional approach 
of operational strengthening to the building of institutions that will strengthen 
accountability and transparency in the security sector.  
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